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This paper demonstrates that unionization can affect cost of 
production through increases in compensation,  through shifts in 
technologies,  and through deviations from the least-cost combination of 
inputs.  The first two effects are familiar, but the third, the 
factor-use effect,  is not.  Identification of this effect resolves two 
important questions.  One,  when unionization compensation and 
productivity effects are found to be largely offsetting,  why doesn't 
the labor intensity of production decline, as predicted,  and why do 
' 
employers continue to resist unionization?  Two,  why do employers 
complain that work and staffing rules reduce "productivity" when there 
is little theoretical or empirical reason to believe that this is so? 
The paper presents estimates of compensation,  productivity, and 
factor-use effects to illustrate the answers to these questions. UNIONIZATION AND COST OF PRODUCTION:  COMPENSATION, 
PRODUCTIVITY, AND FACTOR-USE EFFECTS 
I.  Introduction 
Two paradoxes confound analysis of the effect of unions on the cost 
of production.  One is that productivity increases attributed to unions 
by Brown and Medof  f  (1978)  and others' are of  ten large enough to of  f- 
set, or almost offset, cost increases from the union compensation pre- 
mium, suggesting that the total effect of unionization is small for cost 
2  of production but large for employment.  To borrow the words of Hirsch 
and Addison (1986),  "This finding is, frankly, implausible ...."  Wessels 
(1985)  agrees and notes, "...these  results appear to conflict with other 
well-known evidence on unions.  If unions did have such a substantial 
impact on labor productivity, they should reduce employment far more than 
has been commonly observed."  Clark (1980),  in fact, found that unionized 
- 
cement plants are characterized by more  labor-intensive production than 
nonunionized plants, whereas the compensation and productivity changes 
3  associated with cement unions lead one to expect the reverse.  In 
addition, the small cost effect of unionization implied by comparisons of 
the productivity and compensation effects is inconsistent with both the 
intensity of employer opposition to unionization and direct estimates of 
the total effect. 
4 
The second paradox involves the work rules, employment-security 
protocols, and staffing requirements prevalent in union contracts.  Des- pite complaints by employers that these restrictive employment rules 
reduce productivity, there is little systematic evidence that this is 
5  so.  Johnson  (1986)  has shown, in fact, that under a broad range of 
circumstances, unions and employers will not bargain employment restric- 
tions that result in technical inefficiency because such bargains are 
6  Pareto-inferior.  Thus, it is not surprising that most research sug- 
gests that this type of technical inefficiency is not a substantial 
source of increased cost.  In fact, the overall effect of unions on pro- 
ductivity is typically positive.  Why, then, do employers complain about 
work rules and employment restrictions?  How,  for example, can the ab- 
sence of productivity effects for work rules be reconciled with evidence 
presented by Piore  (1982)  that work rules are at least as important as 
labor compensation in firm location decisions? 
We resolve these two paradoxes by identifying three theoretical 
components of the union effect on cost of production.  One is the famil- 
iar component related to the union/nonunion  labor compensation differen- 
tial.  The other two represent separate components of the union effect on 
efficiency:  (1)  changes in "technical efficiency"  (shifts  in the pro- 
duction technology);  and  (2)  changes in "allocative efficiency"  (factor 
use that deviates from the least-cost combination of inputs). 
Although the compensation and productivity effects are familiar and 
subject to wide investigation, the factor-use effect is not.  There is, 
however, a strong a priori reason to believe that factor-use distortions 
are significant in unionized firms.  A number of recent papers  (including 
McDonald and Solow [1981], Clark [19841, Abowd  [1985],  Brown and Ashen- 
felter [1986], Eberts and Stone [1986b], Johnson [1986], and MaCurdy and 
Pencavel [1986])  demonstrate that Pareto-efficient collective bargaining contracts normally require constraints on the level of employment.  These 
constraints are necessary because compensation exceeds the marginal rev- 
enue product at every point on the contract curve except the competitive 
I  one. 
Distinguishing the factor-use effect of unionization on cost of 
production is important not only because it resolves the two paradoxes, 
but also because it helps to clarify the interpretation of previous work 
on featherbedding  and work rules in union contracts.  Most previous stud- 
ies of the effects of union work rules deal only with technical efficien- 
cy and the productivity effect, not with allocative efficiency, and the 
distinction is not always made clear.  Furthermore, recent studies that 
do examine allocative efficiency  (Allen  [19861) yield ambiguous results 
because they do not formally distinguish the compensation, productivity, 
and factor-use effects. 
Our paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we derive 
a restricted minimum-cost function that incorporates union effects on 
cost through restrictions on factor use, as well as through changes in 
compensation  and in the production technology.  In Section 111,  we illus- 
trate the three effects graphically, evaluate the significance of the 
factor-use effect in resolving the contradictions pointed out by Wessels 
and others, argue that previous attempts to isolate the factor-use effect 
are inappropriate,  and present estimates of the three effects for public 
elementary schools.  A final section summarizes our major conclusions. 
11.  Theoretical.  Framework 
We begin with a standard problem of cost minimization, where the firm seeks to minimize the cost of production subject to the level of 
input prices and constraints of output and production technology.  Our 
firm seeks to minimize the following cost of production: 
where C is the total cost of production, L is the quantity of labor 
employed, A is the quantity of an alternative factor employed,  and w and 
a are the respective factor prices.  For our purposes, it is useful to 
specify the following constraints faced by the firm: 
Equation (2)  expresses the output of good z as a function of the 
level of labor (L),  the alternative factor  (A),  and unionization (U). 
Unionization is expressed here as a continuous variable, consistent with 
the central role of bargaining power in the contract-curve literature. 
We assume that the production function is concave and twice differen- 
tiable. 
Equation  (3)  is the function for the union compensation premium and 
is assumed to be quasi-concave and differentiable.  Equation (4) is an 
implicit specification  of the potential side constraint on employment 
imposed by union work rules, staffing requirements, and the like, where ZA and  ZL  are the marginal products.  We assume that the restriction 
is an increasing function of unionization,  so that nonzero values of U 
require deviations from the least-cost combination of  inputs  (which  is 
obtained by equating the ratio of marginal products to the ratio of 
factor prices).  In practice, the restriction is likely to be in the form 
of an inequality constraint, but is expressed as a strict equality here. 
We also abstract from the process that determined the restriction, taking 
it as given for the current cost-minimization problem.  Other specifica- 
tions of equation  (4)  are possible, but this specification is especially 
tractable and is suggested by the role of bargaining power in the con- 
tracting literature, where the excess of compensation over the value of 
the marginal product reflects bargaining power. 
Normally, the minimum-cost function for a firm facing parametric 
input prices can be expressed simply as the sum of the respective prod- 
ucts of each factor price and the constant-output demand for that fac- 
tor.  Union effects on cost of production are introduced through compen- 
sation and the production function.  If the unionized firm is not strict- 
ly free to choose the least-cost combination of inputs, however, the 
constant-output factor-demand equations are conditional on the factor-use 
restriction.  In this case, unionization affects cost through changes in 
factor use, as well as through changes in compensation and in the produc- 
tion technology.  Thus, equations (1) through  (4)  yield the following 
restricted minimum-cost function: 
where C*  is the restricted minimum-cost function and L*  and A*  are the restricted least-cost factor-demand equations.  The expressions w(.), 
L*(.),  R(.),  and A*(.)  are implicit functions.  Equation  (5)  differs from 
the standard minimum-cost function because factor-use decisions are 
restricted by equation  (4).  Therefore, we refer to equation (5)  as a 
restricted minimum-cost function. 
The compensation,  productivity, and factor-use effects are derived 
by differentiating equation  (5)  with respect to unionization and by 
arranging terms.  The compensation effect is simply 
which is the product of the initial cost-minimizing level of labor ser- 
vices (L*) and the marginal union compensation premium (w,). 
The productivity effect  (a  shift in production technology with the 
factor-use restriction held constant) is 
which is the change in the input requirements  (evaluated  at original fac- 
tor prices) for a fixed output (2,). 
The factor-use effect is 
which is the effect of the union-induced factor-use restriction on the 
input requirements for a fixed output  (evaluated  at the original factor 
prices).  If unionization imposes no factor-use distortions, then Ru is necessarily zero.  LRR (A*R) is equal to the deviation of  the 
restricted value of L* (A*)  from the unrestricted least-cost value that 
8  would otherwise obtain.  In reality, of course, work rules and staf- 
fing requirements may not impose an exact restriction on labor.  It is 
important to note that a restriction on one factor generally distorts the 
-  use of other factors, so that analysis of labor use alone is insuffi- 
cient. 
If  one is evaluating the total derivative of  the restricted cost 
function at nonunion values  (that  is, at U equal to zero),  then the three 
effects listed above exhaust the nonzero terms and can be separated 
uniquely.  Two complications arise when this is not the case, that is, 
when U is not equal to zero.  One is that the following term becomes non- 
zero  : 
This expression is the product of the marginal union effect on compensa- 
tion and the reciprocity relation of cost minimization  (see  Silberberg 
C19781).  With no factor-use restriction  (which  obtains at U equal to 
zero),  this equation is zero because w.L*,  is equal to, but opposite in 
sign from, a.A*,  at the unrestricted least-cost combination of inputs. 
Because equation  (9)  is the result of an interaction between the compen- 
sation premium and factor-use distortions, it cannot be uniquely attrib- 
uted to either. 
The second complication also involves interactions.  As the values 
of w, L*,  A*, and R move away from the nonunion values, additional inter- 
actions arise between the compensation, productivity, and factor-use effects.  In the compensation effect, equation (6), the value of L*  at 
any point will, in general, depend on existing compensation, produc- 
tivity, and factor-use effects.  In the productivity effect, equation 
(7),  the value of w will depend on the existing compensation premium, and 
the values of L*,  and A*,  will, in general, depend on existing com- 
pensation, productivity, and factor-use effects.  Similar interactions 
arise in the factor-use effect, equation  (8).  As with all interactions, 
attribution of any of the interactive parts of equations (7),  (8), or  (9) 
to any one of the component effects  is arbitrary.  Typically, however, 
interactions are dominated by the accumulation of the main effects, but 
do introduce a range of ambiguity.  Like standard measures of income and 
substitution effects in consumption, measures of the compensation, pro- 
ductivity, and factor-use effects are path-dependent. 
111.  Graphic Illustration and Discussion 
The compensation, productivity, and factor-use effects of unioniza- 
tion on cost of production  (and  their path-dependence) can be illustrated 
using figure 1, which expresses the relationship between cost of produc- 
tion and labor compensation (w) with output and other factor prices held 
constant and unionization treated as a binary variable.  cN  is the 
minimum-cost function for nonunion firms, and wN is the level of non- 
union compensation.  cR  is the restricted minimum-cost function for 
union firms, which includes both the productivity and factor-use effects, 
and w
U is the level of union compensation.  cR  in figure 1 is defined 
for a given deviation from equality of the ratio of marginal products and 
the ratio of factor prices, because unionization is held constant.  C" Cost 
Figure 1  Illustration of Compensation, Productivity and Factor-Use Effects is the unrestricted minimum-cost function for union firms that would 
obtain in the absence of any restrictions on factor use.  This function 
includes the productivity effect but excludes the factor-use effect. 
Relative positions of the three functions are arbitrary, and the curva- 
ture of each function reflects the corresponding elasticity of 
substitution. 
Taking one path, we can measure the compensation effect  as the 
movement from point A  to point B along the nonunion cost function, the 
productivity effect as the shift from point B to point D,  and the 
factor-use effect as the shift from point D to point F.  Taking a dif- 
ferent path, however, we could measure the productivity effect as the 
shift from point A  to  point C, the compensation effect as the movement 
from point C  to point D along the unrestricted union cost function,  and 
the factor-use effect again as the shift from point D to point F.  This 
path will in fact coincide with the first path if  the technology shift 
from cN  to  cU  is neutral, as is suggested by much of the empirical 
work in this area.  In this case, AC  is proportionately the same as BD, 
and CD is proportionately the same as AB.  Other paths are obviously 
possible. 
Resolving the Paradoxes 
Figure 1 also illustrates how the factor-use effect resolves the 
paradox raised by comparisons of the compensation and productivity 
effects.  If one ignores the factor-use effect, significant increases in 
compensation and roughly offsetting increases in technical efficiency 
imply only a small change in total cost and sharply lower labor intensi- 
ties in union firms.  In fact, however, direct estimates tend to show significant cost increases and similar, or even higher, labor intensi- 
ties.  The factor-use effect reconciles this apparent paradox.  If we 
measure the compensation effect as AB and the productivity effect as BD, 
then the total cost effect is quite small in figure 1,  and employment 
will be sharply lower.  Adding the factor-use effect, however, increases 
costs by DF by preventing the firm from using the least-cost combination 
of factors.  Employment will also be higher than otherwise, obscuring the 
compensation and productivity effects on employment. 
The second paradox is also resolved by the factor-use effect.  Even 
if  work rules do not generally reduce technical efficiency, they can 
still increase cost by preventing the employer from using the least-cost 
combination of inputs  (decreasing  allocative efficiency).  Employers may 
complain about work rules and employment restrictions not because they 
reduce technical efficiency, but because they reduce allocative effi- 
c  iency  . 
Estimating the Factor-use Effect 
At least one previous paper  (Allen  [1986]) has recognized the 
effect of union-induced factor distortions on cost.  An estimate of  the 
factor-use effect for office construction is obtained by first estimating 
a minimum-cost function for nonunion firms and a restricted minimum-cost 
function for union firms, and then by subtracting the estimated compensa- 
tion effect for nonunion firms (AB in dollars as a percent of costs) from 
that for union firms (EF in dollars as a percent of costs),  which is 
assumed to reflect both the compensation and factor-use effects and noth- 
9  ing else.  As one can see in figure 1, however, the difference EF 
minus AB is not a general measure of  the factor-use effect.  It captures only that portion of the factor-use effect that arises from differences 
in the substitution parameters between cN  and cR; the shift in the 
average level of C*  from cU  is not captured.  Moreover, the substitu- 
tion parameters of cR  depend on the productivity effect as well as the 
factor-use effect. 
The difference EF minus AB would measure the factor-use effect if 
the technology shift from cN  to C" were neutral and if  the factor-use 
effect were zero at wN  for union firms.  Under these sufficient condi- 
tions  (and  using proportionate dollar measures),  EF minus CD equals DF, 
AB equals CD, and therefore EF minus AB equals DF, which is a measure of 
the factor-use effect. 
In general, an estimate of the factor-use effect requires estimates 
of all three cost functions:  cN,  cR,  and cU.  The nonunion minimum- 
cost function (cN)  and the restricted union minimum-cost function (cR) 
can be estimated directly.  The unrestricted union minimum-cost function 
(c"),  however, is not directly observed and must be constructed from 
estimates of the union production function via duality. 
10 
Although the data requirements for disentangling the compensation, 
productivity,  and factor-use effects are extensive, they are met for at 
least one sector -- public elementary schools.  Assembling evidence from 
several different but related studies of public schools, we are able to 
obtain estimates of the compensation, productivity,  and factor-use 
effects.  The compensation effect for teacher unions (AB in figure 1) is 
calculated by multiplying a mid-range estimate of the union wage premium 
(16.5%  from Baugh and Stone  119821) by the teacher's share of total cost 
in nonunion schools  (about  60% from Eberts and Stone  [1986a]  ) , which 
yields an estimate of 10% for the compensation effect on total cost. The productivity effect on cost  (BD  in figure 1) is calculated from 
direct estimates of union and nonunion production technologies for indi- 
vidual students presented by Eberts and Stone  (forthcoming).  Measured 
across all students, the average union productivity difference is 3%, 
which results in a productivity effect on cost of -3%. 
The factor-use effect on cost (Dl? in figure 1) is calculated by 
subtracting the estimates of the compensation and productivity effects 
(AB and BD, respectively, in proportionate terms) from an estimate of the 
overall cost difference  (the  difference F minus A in proportionate 
terms).  The total effect on cost  (15%)  is obtained from a reduced-form 
specification of the effect of unionization on cost presented in Eberts 
and Stone (1986a).  Subtracting the compensation and productivity effects 
from the overall effect yields a residual estimate of about 8% for the 
factor-use effects, which is almost as large as the compensation  effect. 
The significance of factor-use distortion in public schools is also 
documented by Eberts  (1984).  With factors other than unionization and 
compensation held constant, they find that average class size is signifi-  - 
cantly lower in unionized districts.  Furthermore, variations within the 
union sector in individual contract items dealing with class-size limita- 
tions and reduction-in-force procedures are associated with variations in 
both total cost and the cost share for teachers. 
IV.  Concluding Remarks 
The effect  of unionization on cost of production consists of three 
effects:  the compensation effect  (arising  from the union compensation 
premium),  the productivity effect  (arising  from technology shifts due perhaps to greater cooperation between management and workers, reductions 
in turnover, and increased worker morale),  and the factor-use effect 
(arising  from deviations from the least-cost combination of inputs).  The 
compensation and productivity effects are familiar, but the factor-use 
effect is not.  This effect resolves two existing paradoxes:  (1) produc- 
tivity and compensation effects of unionization typically imply a small 
net effect on cost of production, but employer resistance to unionization 
and direct evidence on cost suggest a large effect; and  (2)  employers 
complain that work rules and employment restrictions reduce "productiv- 
ity," but there is little systematic evidence that this is so. 
The factor-use effect explains both paradoxes.  For collective 
bargaining to avoid increasing costs, it is not enough that the produc- 
tivity effect offset the compensation effect; it must also offset the 
factor-use effect.  Furthermore, work rules and employment restrictions 
can increase cost without reducing technical productivity by requiring 
the employer to deviate from the least-cost combination of inputs. 
Recent work in the contracting literature suggests that factor-use 
restrictions are required to enforce Pareto-efficient contracts because 
employment is "excessive"  at all points on the contract curve except the 
competitive one.  There is reason to believe, therefore, that factor-use 
distortions are commonplace in unionized firms.  Work rules and employ- 
ment restrictions have been widely examined for their effects on techni- 
cal efficiency  (shifts  in the production technology),  but efficient con- 
tracting, estimates of the effect on technical efficiency, and our 
analysis here suggest that the primary effect of these restrictions is 
instead on allocative efficiency  (distortions  from the least-cost combi- 
nation of inputs). -15- 
Footnotes 
1.  Other studies include Clark (1980),  Allen (1984),  and Eberts and 
Stone  (forthcoming). 
2.  Not all estimates of the productivity effect of unions are signifi- 
cantly positive.  Clark (1984),  Ehrenberg,  Sherman, and Schwarz (19831, 
and Noam (1983),  for example, report either negative or insignificant 
productivity effects. 
3.  A similar increase in labor intensity is reported by Eberts (1984) 
for public schools.  Clark  (1984)  reports little difference in factor 
intensities in manufacturing, which is still inconsistent with the pre- 
diction of a sharp decline in labor intensity. 
4.  Eberts and Stone (1986a),  for example, provide evidence that the 
overall cost effect for public schools is inconsistent with the sum of 
the estimated productivity and compensation effects. 
5.  Most of the studies that do present evidence interpreted as the 
effect of work rules on productivity do not distinguish between technical 
and allocative efficiency.  An exception is Ichniowski (1984). 
6.  Technically inefficient work rules or staffing arrangements will be 
bargained only under two conditions:  (1)  there must be no technology 
available that would be "appropriate"  for the level of nonunion wages; 
and  (2)  the union must p1ace.a  much greater weight on employment than on 
wages  (Johnson  [  1986  1 1. 
7.  The contract curve is bounded by the labor demand and labor supply 
curves.  Thus, at one extreme the contract curve may coincide with labor 
demand.  In this case, no employment restrictions are necessary to enforce the contract. 
8.  This statement is correct when the deviations are evaluated at the 
unrestricted values of L*  and A*  (R equal to 1).  Elsewhere (R greater 
than I),  L*R  and A*R are equal to the change in the deviation of the 
restricted value from the unrestricted value that would otherwise obtain. 
9.  Allen scales the percentages relative to union costs at point E in 
figure 1.  The calculations are also based solely on changes in labor 
costs. 
10.  Alternatively, the factor-use effect could also be estimated using 
parametric techniques employed by Lau and Yotopoulos (1971),  Toda (1976), 
Love11 and Sickles (1983),  and Atkinson and Halvorsen  (1984)  to estimate 
allocative inefficiency. References 
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